Archive for the Correspondence US Category

Report of Col. J. Irvin Gregg

Posted in 16th Penn Cav, Correspondence US on November 25, 2008 by Craig Swain

March 18, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my regiment, the Sixteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, in the cavalry action near Kelly’s Ford on the 17th instant:

On arriving at the ford, I received an order to send forward all the axes in my regiment, and immediately dispatched 20 men, under command of First Lieut. A. J. Snyder. The party bore itself gallantly, and did good service in removing the blockade at the fording, and crossed with the First Rhode Island men. I desire to recommend to the favorable notice of the colonel commanding Sergeant [Samuel] McGowan, of Company H, Private [Edward] Claffrey, Company A, and Saddler F. J. Canman, Company I. These men have had charges preferred against them, and I trust their behavior in the late engagement will be taken into account in making Up their sentence.

The position occupied by my regiment was the extreme right of the line, with my right resting on the river, with my skirmishers thrown forward and deployed at a distance of 300 yards, and concealed from view by a wood of cedar trees and outbuildings. Shortly after the attack commenced on the left and center, I observed a large force of the enemy moving rapidly toward our right, evidently with a view of outflanking us, and asked for and obtained permission to dismount a portion of my command and occupy the buildings immediately in my front. This was not done a moment too soon, as the enemy were already entering the outer gate, when a volley from behind the houses drove them back. They soon rallied from behind some trees and out of carbine range, and, supposing from the maneuvers that it was their intention to dismount a portion of their men and gain our rear under cover of the bushes which lined the bank of the river, I dismounted the balance of my command, and threw my entire force some 300 yards in advance of the houses, under cover of a stone wall, and drove the enemy from the position. A charge of 30 men, led by Major Fry, drove a squadron of the enemy from the woods immediately in my front. Finding that the enemy did not approach, I mounted my command, and took up a position on the right of the line, and moved forward until farther progress was arrested by a dense woods, where I again dismounted my command, and threw it forward on the enemy’s left flank, obliging him to move his position three times.

I am happy to state that I did not lose a single officer or man from my command, and had but 1 man, Private George Derlin, slightly wounded.

Major Fry, Captains Kennedy and Alexander, Lieutenants Snyder and Young, as well as all the men under my command, deserve great credit for the promptness with which they advanced under fire.

I am not able to give an accurate account of the enemy’s killed and wounded. Fourteen dead bodies were counted on the right, and several others were seen to fall from their horses, apparently dead. The number of wounded must have been in the same proportion, as quite a large number of sabers were scattered over the ground. I apprehend that 30 killed and wounded from the effects of my fire is a very moderate estimate. The officers immediately in command of the dismounted men estimate a much larger number. I have also to report the following captured property:

Pistols    7

Sabers   9

Bridles   4

Carbines            1

Saddles 2

Horses   2

There were many sabers lying on the field, but being of so many patterns, and without scabbards, I did not deem them worth picking Up. Horses captured will be carried on the company report; the other property is in the hands of the men who captured it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


Colonel, Commanding Sixteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry.


Second Brigade, Second Cavalry Division.


Report of Col. John B. McIntosh

Posted in 3rd Penn Cav, Correspondence US on November 25, 2008 by Craig Swain


SIR: I have the honor to report that this brigade, consisting of ——men, left camp at 9 o’clock on the morning of the 16th instant, and encamped that night with the division at Morrisville.

At 4 o’clock on the morning of the 17th instant I started with my brigade for Kelly’s Ford, and reached there by 6 a.m. The enemy was strongly posted on the southwest bank, and for a short time offered a stubborn resistance. It was at this juncture I detailed all the axmen from my brigade, under command of Lieutenant Gillmore, of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, who crossed with the advance guard, and cut away the trees the enemy had felled in order to obstruct the exit from the ford. After my brigade had crossed the river, and shortly after 12 m., the enemy made a sharp attack on the First Brigade, then advancing slowly through the woods. In obedience to the orders of the general, I deployed my brigade to the right, the Sixteenth Pennsylvania being on the extreme right. The enemy made an attempt to gain the cover of some houses on my right, when I immediately ordered Colonel Gregg to dismount a part of his command and throw them behind the houses, which he successfully accomplished, and, by a few well-directed volleys, caused them to retreat rapidly. I then formed my squadrons en échelon, and advanced slowly, driving the enemy completely from my front by well-directed volleys.

The enemy made no attempt to charge my brigade, nor did they appear in my front in any locality where I had an opportunity to charge them.

The loss of the brigade in killed, wounded, and missing is as follows :(*)

Third Pennsylvania Cavalry:

Officer wounded 1

Enlisted man wounded     1

Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry:

Officers wounded            2

Enlisted men wounded      4

Sixteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry:

Enlisted man wounded     1


Col. Third Pa. Cav., Comdg. Second Brig., Second Div.]


Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Cav. Div.

Report of Lieut. George Browne, Jr.

Posted in 6th NY Ind Bty, Correspondence US on November 25, 2008 by Craig Swain

Near Aquia Creek, Va., March 19, 1863.

LIEUTENANT: I beg to submit the following report of the participation of my battery in the recent expeditionary movement commanded by Brigadier-General Averell:

Pursuant to orders from headquarters Cavalry Corps, dated March 15, 1863, my battery took up its march from camp near Aquia Creek at daybreak on the morning of the 16th instant, but owing to the fact of the guide having mistaken the road, I did not reach Hartwood Church until 4 p.m.

Upon my arrival there, I reported to Colonel Curtis, and received an escort to Morrisville, which place I reached at 11 p.m.

We halted, fed the horses, and moved forward with the column at 4.30 a.m. of the 17th instant, arriving at Kelly’s Ford at about 6.30 a.m.

Upon arriving at the ford, skirmishing commenced between the cavalry pickets of the enemy and our advance. The enemy here making a very stubborn resistance to our crossing, I was ordered to advance one piece into position, with a view to cover the axmen who were employed in removing the obstructions to the ford, which being accomplished, our cavalry advanced to the ford. After one or two attempts, a crossing was effected and the enemy driven in all directions, some 30 prisoners being taken, together with horses and equipments.

At this time I brought one more piece into position, to cover the crossing of the main column, which, being effected, my battery went forward, piece by piece, over the ford, one squadron of cavalry carrying over the ammunition by hand, which was necessitated by the depth of the water. We then moved forward, and our advance came up with the enemy about half a mile from the ford.

At this time my right section was ordered forward, and, after advancing a short distance, the cavalry became engaged with the enemy, who were in force. Owing, however, to the narrow and extremely muddy and impracticable condition of the road, I could bring but one piece into battery, sending the others to the rear. The enemy now appeared in such force as to momentarily check the advance of our cavalry, which, however, soon rallied, and drove them from the woods, their left flank being turned by our cavalry on the right, with which was posted two of my pieces, commanded by Lieutenant Clark, and which did good execution. The enemy were driven across the plain in the greatest confusion.

At this time I received an order from Lieutenant Rumsey to bring my whole battery into position into the open field from which the enemy had been driven. This order I executed at once, calling in the two pieces which were posted with the cavalry on the right, as also the two pieces which were with the reserve. I formed my battery in line, and moved forward with the cavalry to the woods at the farther extremity of the plain, where we formed in battery to receive the enemy, who was expected to make a charge. At this point, by command of Lieutenant Rumsey, I left two of my pieces with the reserve, their ammunition being nearly exhausted.

After a brief delay, we again moved forward in column of pieces, with the cavalry skirmishing as they advanced for about a mile, and came into battery of four pieces in a large open plain on the left of the road. At this point we received from the enemy the first intimation that our farther advance would be opposed by artillery. They opened a fire with shot and shell upon our column as it came up the road, having three pieces in position commanding the road, consisting of two 10-pounder rifles and one 6-pounder gun. On their extreme right was posted another section of their artillery, which was not used, being probably held in reserve to check our farther advance.

Having already expended one-half of my ammunition, I had remaining 150 rounds when I entered this field, and could only fire, therefore, at long intervals, deeming it prudent to reserve my fire for the opposing columns of cavalry, and at long and uncertain ranges upon the enemy’s artillery, as it was evident they intended to charge us at once.

In this conclusion we were not at fault, for the enemy soon appeared in force in our immediate front, extending from the right to the left of the road, with the evident object of driving in the supports on either flank of the battery. As I observed this, I opened upon them with shell at about 1,500 yards, and at a distance of, say, 1,000 yards with spherical case, continuing it until they arrived at about 400 yards, when, obliquing my sections to both flanks, I opened on them with double-shotted canister with great effect. Our cavalry at this moment charged the lines of the enemy, driving them back in confusion, when I immediately changed the direction of my fire to the enemy’s artillery. It now became evident, both from the statements of wounded prisoners and other sources, that the enemy were being largely re-enforced both by artillery and cavalry. We, however, maintained our position for about an hour, replying at intervals to their artillery, which was most advantageously posted and commanded every approach by the front and flank, their cavalry being at the same time masked by the woods on either flank of their batteries, which kept up a constant and harassing fire upon us, to which, however, I could only reply occasionally, thinking it prudent to reserve a supply to cover the recrossing, should it be necessary to do so. Upon receiving an order from General Averell to fall back, I limbered up, recrossed the ford, and placed two pieces in position on the opposite bank to cover the crossing of the remaining columns, sending the balance to Morrisville with a regiment of cavalry, the First Rhode Island. The recrossing having been effected without loss, in conformity with orders I proceeded to Morrisville, where the column halted until daybreak, when we returned to camp via Hartwood Church.

As regards the loss of the enemy, I have no means of determining, but from my own observation I should say that it far exceeded ours, their prisoners saying also that they suffered very heavily.

As to the effect of this affair upon the morale of our cavalry, it only strengthens my belief in their superiority and efficiency over that of the enemy, as was clearly demonstrated in each encounter.

I beg to tender my acknowledgments to the staff and officers of General Averell’s command for the courtesy and consideration shown to me and my command, it being the first occasion on which my battery has ever had the opportunity to maneuver with cavalry, and they were, therefore, perhaps in some respects deficient in the requirements of this branch of the service.

I have to report the following casualties: One man (Private Richard Paxton) and 2 horses killed; 2 sets of horse equipments unavoidably lost; 1 wheel for 6-pounder carriage badly damaged; 1 sponge-bucket and 2 handspikes lost; 6 sponge-staffs broken; 3 felling axes loaned to cavalry and not returned. <ar39_56>


Ammunition expended:

Hotchkiss canister            32

Schenkl percussion shell    90

Hotchkiss shrapnel           100

Hotchkiss shell    25

Total 247

I am, lieutenant, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


First Lieut., Comdg. Sixth Independent N. Y. Horse Battery.

First Lieut. C. F. TROWBRIDGE,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Report of General William Averell

Posted in Battle Maps, Correspondence US, Federal, Second Division on November 25, 2008 by Craig Swain

March 20, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that, pursuant to instructions received from you, I left the main body of this army on the 16th instant, for the purpose of crossing the Rappahannock River and attacking the cavalry forces of the enemy, reported to be in the vicinity of Culpepper Court-House, under the command of General Fitzhugh Lee. My orders were to attack and rout or destroy him. To execute these orders, I was directed to take a force of 3,000 cavalry and six pieces of artillery. Accompanying the orders were several reports containing information of the operations of rebel cavalry north of the river, in the vicinity of Brentsville, the force of which was reported from 250 to 1,000, with at least one piece of artillery, and I was directed to take every precaution to insure the success of my expedition. As a precautionary measure, I requested that a regiment of cavalry be sent to Catlett’s Station, which is the key-point to the middle fords of the Rappahannock, to throw out from thence pickets in the direction of Warrenton, Greenwich, and Brentsville. My request Was not granted, and I was obliged to detach about 900 men from my force to guard the fords and look out for the force alluded to in the information.

The battery ordered from near Aquia Creek made a march of 32 miles on the 16th, and joined my command at Morrisville at 11 o’clock that night, with horses in poor condition for the expedition. Small parties of my cavalry had been sent, two to four hours in advance, on all the roads and to the fords, to mask the approach of my main body from the enemy’s scouts.

On the night of the 16th, the fires of a camp of the enemy were seen from Mount Holly Church by my scouts, between Ellis’ and Kelly’s Fords, and the drums, beating retreat and tattoo, were heard from their camps near Rappahannock Station. Rebel cavalry appeared in front of my pickets on the roads leading west during the evening of the 16th.

Lieutenant-Colonel Curtis, First Massachusetts Cavalry, was left at Morrisville to take charge of all my cavalry pickets north of the Rappahannock, <ar39_48> who directed Lieutenant-Colonel Doster, Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry, with 290 men, to start from Mount Holly Church at 4 a.m. on the 17th instant, and drive the enemy’s pickets toward Rappahannock Station; to go thence to Bealeton, and, finally, to station himself at Morgansburg and communicate with a picket which would be established at Elk Run and with Curtis’ force at Morrisville. These orders were executed, and the enemy driven out of that section.

At 4 a.m. I set out from Morrisville with a command of about 2,100 men, made up as follows: From the First Brigade, Second Division, Colonel Duffie, 775; from the Second Brigade, Second Division, Colonel Mcintosh, 565; from the Reserve Brigade, Captain Reno, 760, and the Sixth Independent New York Battery, Lieutenant Browne commanding. Kelly’s Ford was selected for the crossing, because the opposite country was better known to me than that beyond any other ford, and it afforded the shortest route to the enemy’s camp.

The head of my column arrived at the ford at 8 a.m. The crossing was found obstructed by fallen trees, forming an abatis upon both banks, which, defended by 80 sharpshooters, covered by rifle-pits and houses on the opposite bank, rendered the crossing difficult. Two squadrons were dismounted and advanced under shelter of an empty mill-race or canal, which runs near the bank of the river, whence a brisk fire was at once opened, under which an attempt was made to cross by the advance, which failed. Two subsequent attempts of the pioneers met with the same fate. During this time a crossing was attempted one-fourth of a mile below, but it was found impracticable, owing to the depth of the stream and the precipitous character of the banks. After half an hour had passed in endeavors to cross, my chief of staff, Maj. S. E. Chamberlain, who had immediate charge of the operations at the crossing, selected a party of 20 men, and placed them under the command of Lieutenant Brown, First Rhode Island Cavalry, with orders to cross the river and not return. Lieutenant Brown obeyed his orders; the abatis was passed, and 25 of the enemy were captured.

Two pieces of the battery had been unlimbered, but I hesitated to open them until all other means should fail, as I did not care to give the enemy sufficient warning of my advance to bring him to attack me while astride the stream.

The First Brigade was immediately crossed and placed in position, followed by two pieces; then the Second Brigade, the remainder of the battery, and the reserve. The stream has a very rapid current at the ford, and was about 4 feet 5 inches deep. The ammunition was taken out of the limbers and carried over in nose-bags by the cavalry.

The crossing was not effected without loss. My chief of staff, Major Chamberlain, fell with a dangerous wound in the head; Lieutenant [John P.] Domingo, Fourth New York Cavalry, was seriously wounded, and Lieutenant [Henry L.] Nicolai, First Rhode Island Cavalry, killed; 2 men killed, and 5 wounded; 15 horses killed and wounded.

My command was drawn up so as to meet the enemy in every direction as fast as it crossed, and pickets pushed out on the roads running from the ford.

From what I had learned of Lee’s position, and from what I knew personally of his character, I expected him to meet me on the road to his camp, and I could not object to such a proceeding, as it would not make it necessary for me to march so far to a fight. My horses would be fresher and the chances of battle be more nearly equalized.

The horses of my command were watered by squadrons, and at 12 m. I moved on, with the First Brigade in advance. Looking toward <ar39_49> the west from the ford, one sees half a mile in advance a skirt of woods on higher ground, around the right of which may be seen an open field. It is about one-fourth of a mile through the woods. When the head of my column reached the western edge of this timber, the enemy were discovered rapidly advancing in line, with skirmishers in front. I immediately ordered the Fourth New York to the right, to form front into line and advance to the edge of the woods and use carbines; the Fourth Pennsylvania to the left, with the same orders, and a section of artillery to the front to open fire. Sent to Mcintosh to form line of battle on the right of the woods; Reno to send three squadrons to act as a reserve to the right, and one squadron up the road to support the center, and one section to the right with McIntosh.

The Fourth Pennsylvania and Fourth New York, I regret to say, did not come up to the mark at first, and it required some personal exertions on the part of myself and staff to bring them under the enemy’s fire, which was now sweeping the woods. They soon regained their firmness, and opened with effect with their carbines. At this moment I observed two or three columns of the enemy moving at a trot toward my right. I immediately went to the threatened point, and found that it was a question which should obtain possession of a house and outbuildings situated there. McIntosh soon decided it by establishing some dismounted men of the Sixteenth thereabouts, and the section of artillery soon opened with splendid effect. The right was then advanced into the open field beyond the house, and the enemy’s left attacked by McIntosh and Gregg. Duffie in the meantime had formed the First Rhode Island, Fourth Pennsylvania, and Sixth Ohio in front of the left, and the enemy were advancing to charge him.

Perceiving his want of support, I called to Reno for three squadrons, and we went to the left at a gallop, while Duffie advanced in splendid order and charged the enemy. The gallantry of Duffie had, perhaps, made him forget to leave any portion of his command as a support, excepting the Fourth New York. Two squadrons of the Fifth United States rushed across the field, while Mcintosh came in on the left flank of a fresh rebel column, and the enemy were torn to pieces and driven from the field in magnificent style. Had it been possible to reach the enemy’s flank when Duffie charged with the Fifth United States or Third Pennsylvania, 300 to 500 prisoners might have been captured, but the distance was too great for the time, the ground was very heavy, and the charge was made three minutes too soon, and without any prearranged support.

A little reorganization was requisite before advancing farther. It was necessary to form my line again and get stragglers from the Fourth New York and other regiments out of the woods behind, to assemble the sections of the battery, bring up the reserve, and give orders with regard to the wounded and prisoners. These duties occupied me half an hour or more. In advancing from the field we had won, I found the ground impracticable on the left of the road, by reason of its marshy condition. My left was, therefore, rested on the road, and the advance given to a squadron of the Fifth, under Lieutenant Sweatman. After advancing in line of battle three-quarters of a mile, driving the enemy before us through the woods, with the artillery supported by a column upon the road, we found ourselves through the woods and in the face of the enemy, drawn up in line of battle on both sides of the road half a mile in front. It became necessary to extend my line to the left as soon as possible.

The enemy opened two field-pieces upon the road with precision, and  advanced upon both flanks with great steadiness. They were at once repulsed on the right. The squadrons to form the left were shifted from the right of the road under a terrific fire of shot, shell, and small-arms, and the enemy in superior numbers bore down on my left flank, arriving within 400 yards of the battery while it was unlimbering. Lieutenant Browne, commanding the battery, assisted by my aide, Lieutenant Rumsey, soon got two or three pieces playing upon them with damaging effect, and a general cavalry fight ensued on the left. We never lost a foot of ground, but kept steadily advancing until we arrived at a stubble-field, which the enemy set on fire to the windward, to burn us out. My men rushed forward, and beat it out with their overcoats. Here the enemy opened three pieces, two 10-pounder Parrotts and one 6-pounder gun from the side of the hill directly in front of my left. No horses could be discovered about these guns, and from the manner in which they were served it was evident that they were covered by earthworks. It was also obvious that our artillery could not hurt them. Our ammunition was of miserable quality and nearly exhausted. There were 18 shells in one section that would not fit the pieces, the fuses were unreliable, 5-second fuses would explode in two seconds, and many would not explode at all. Theirs, on the contrary, was exceedingly annoying. Firing at a single company or squadron in line, they would knock a man out of ranks very frequently. As soon as the enemy’s heavy guns were opened, his cavalry advanced again on my right, strongly re-enforced. They were repulsed with severe loss by Walker, of the Fifth, and Mcintosh. Mcintosh and Gregg pushed on to their left flank until they came to the rifle-pits, which could not easily be turned. Their skirmishers again threatened my left, and it was reported to me that infantry had been seen at a distance to my right, moving toward my rear, and the cars could be heard running on the road in rear of the enemy, probably bringing re-enforcements.

It was 5.30 p.m., and it was necessary to advance my cavalry upon their intrenched positions, to make a direct and desperate attack, or to withdraw across the river. Either operation would be attended with imminent hazard. My horses were very much exhausted. We had been successful thus far. I deemed it proper to withdraw. The reserve was advanced in front and deployed to mask the battery, which was withdrawn, and the regiments retired in succession until the ford was reached and crossed without the loss of a man in the operation.

The country in which these operations were conducted is level and open, and had the ground been firm would have been eminently fitted for a cavalry fight.

The principal result achieved by this expedition has been that our cavalry has been brought to feel their superiority in battle; they have learned the value of discipline and the use of their arms. At the first view, I must confess that two regiments wavered, but they did not lose their senses, and a few energetic remarks brought them to a sense of their duty. After that the feeling became stronger throughout the day that it was our fight, and the maneuvers were performed with a precision which the enemy did not fail to observe.

The enemy’s first attack was vigorous and fierce, and it took about an hour to convince him on the first field that it was necessary for him to abandon it. Between his first grand advance and his final effort there were several small charges and counter-charges which filled up the time.

I ought to mention that in front of the first wood there is a deep, broad ditch, along which runs a heavy stone wall, which served as a


cover for my carbineers, but which was impassable for cavalry except around the right flank and where it was broken down in the center, and this impeded my operations somewhat. In the second field the enemy’s cavalry force was superior to mine, but it was constantly repulsed, and when I withdrew my command it was with unabated confidence in our strength as against cavalry. I hoped that they would advance, but they made no demonstration worthy of notice, even while I was withdrawing my command.

The officers and men of the battery performed their arduous duties with alacrity.

Whatever of success may have attended this expedition, I am greatly indebted to the vigorous and untiring efforts of my staff, Maj. S. E. Chamberlain, First Massachusetts; Captains [Philip] Pollard and [Alexander] Moore, of General Hooker’s staff, and Lieutenants [Charles F.] Trowbridge and [William] Rumsey; but to those officers and men of the command who exhibited the unflinching courage which attends a settled purpose, my thanks are especially due. For distinguished gallantry I beg leave to call your attention to the names of Maj. S. E. Chamberlain, my chief of staff, and Second Lieut. Simeon A. Brown, First Rhode Island Cavalry, who first reached the opposite bank. Colonel Duffié was conspicuous for his gallantry; his horse was shot under him. Colonel Mcintosh, who had been left ill in camp, joined me at 1 a.m., at Morrisville, and showed during the day that he possessed the highest qualities of a brigade commander. Captain Reno, whose horse was wounded under him, handled his men gallantly and steadily. Lieutenant Walker, of the Fifth, by his readiness and resolution, did much to repulse the enemy on our left in the second field, when the battery was threatened.

To avoid repetition, I would respectfully call your attention to the names of the killed and wounded, officers and men, in the inclosed list,(*) as deserving of especial notice for distinguished gallantry. Several others had their horses shot under them, and nearly all performed their duty in a manner which cannot be surpassed for coolness and daring.

I inclose list of casualties, of which the aggregate killed, wounded, and missing is 80.(+)

Of the enemy, his force was reported by the prisoners first taken as five regiments, commanded by Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee. Subsequently prisoners reported that he had been re-enforced, and that Major-General Stuart was present. His equipments were inferior, but his horses good. Many of his sabers were manufactured in Richmond. From all the sources, I can estimate the enemy must have left 2 officers and 68 men killed and seriously wounded on the field. If twice as many slightly wounded escaped, his loss in killed and wounded must have been over 200, and his loss in horses must be certainly as great as that of men. I think the above may be an overestimate, but it is made by combining carefully the reports of officers who were in different parts of the field, and who report from observation. The enemy’s loss in prisoners was 47; 15 more are reported, but as yet I am unable to account for them.

I inclose a list of paroled prisoners, who are included in the 47.(*) I inclose also tabular statements of losses of my command and of the enemy.(*) I am compelled to believe that the reports of some officers respecting their losses have been carelessly made out, and that they may have been guided in their statement of numbers by the amounts for which they are accountable. <ar39_53>

I believe it is the universal desire of the officers and men of my division to meet the enemy again as soon as possible.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,


Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding.


Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.


Return of Casualties in the Union forces engaged at Kelly’s Ford, Va., March 17, 1863.

[Compiled from nominal lists of casualties, returns, &c.]

O Officers. A Aggregate

M Enlisted Men. C Captured or missing

–Killed– -Wounded- —–C—–

Command. O M O M O M A



Staff     …. …. 1          …. …. …. 1

First Brigade.


Staff     …. …. 1          …. …. …. 1

4th New York     …. …. 1          2          …. 1          4

6th Ohio            …. …. 2          5          …. 1          8

1st Rhode Island             1          2          4          17         2          16         42

Total 1          2          8          24         2          18         55

Second Brigade.


3d Pennsylvania …. …. 1          1          …. …. 2

4th Pennsylvania             …. …. 2          4          …. …. 6

16th Pennsylvania           …. …. …. 1          …. …. 1

Total …. …. 3          6          …. …. 9

Reserve Brigade.


1st U.S. Cavalry  …. 1          …. 4          …. 1          6

5th U.S. Cavalry …. 1          …. 4          …. 1          6

Total. …. 2          …. 8          …. 2          12


New York Light, 6th Battery          …. 1          …. …. …. …. 1

Total Second Division 1          5          12         38         2          20         78

OFFICERS KILLED.–Lieut. Henry L. Nicolai, First Rhode Island Cavalry.

MORTALLY WOUNDED.–Lieuts. Nathaniel Bowditch, First Massachusetts Cavalry, and John P. Domingo, Fourth New York Cavalry.